Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Holbrook Company, a Utah corporation v. Stanley
S. Adams, Von H. Whitby, Tony M. Wand, a
partnership, dba the exchange : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Boyden and Kennedy; F. Burton Howard; Charles C. Brown; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Adams, Kasting and Anderson; John S. Adams; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Holbrook Company v. Adams, No. 14005.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/125

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY]
DEC l 7 1975
IN THE SUPREME COURT
BRiGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLBROOK COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.

Case No,
14005

STANLEY S. ADAMS, VON H.
WHITBY, TONY M. WAND, a
partnership, dba THE
EXCHANGE,
Defendants and
Respondents,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge
* * * * * * * * * *

BOYDEN & KENNEDY
F. Burton Howard
Charles C. Brown
1000 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON
John S. Adams
Suite 200, The Glass Factory
Arrow Press Square
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

c

(LED
JUL V> 7975

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLBROOK COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.

Case No.
14005

STANLEY S. ADAMS, VON H.
WHITBY, TONY M. WAND, a
partnership, dba THE
EXCHANGE,
Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

Appeal from the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge
* * * * * * *

BOYDEN & KENNEDY
F. Burton Howard
Charles C. Brown
1000 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON
John S. Adams
Suite 200, The Glass Factory
Arrow Press Square
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN MAKING
ITS RULING THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED AS DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PROPER PARTIES AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY

6

POINT II. IN THE EVENT THIS COURT RULES IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, ANY AWARD OF COSTS
SHOULD BE STAYED, THE SAME BEING AWARDED
TO THAT PARTY WHICH ULTIMATELY PREVAILS AT
THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MATTER

19

CONCLUSION

20
CASES

Botkin v. Silveria, 49 Cal.2d, 120 P.2d
910, 1916-1917 (1942)

10

Culver v. Culver, 150 P.2d 292, 65 CA.2d 145 . . . .

10

Hill v. Grand Central Inc., 25 U.2d 121,
477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970)

16, 17

Papinakolas Bros, v. Sugar House Shopping
Center, Utah Case No. 13821, May 27, 1975 . . 10, 18
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. (1953), Section 14-2-1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1, 7, 15

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HOLBROOK COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No,
14005

v.
STANLEY S. ADAMS, VON H.
WHITBY, TONY M. WAND, a
partnership, dba THE
EXCHANGE,
Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENT•S BRIEF
* * * * * * * *

NATURE OF THE CASE
On November 1, 1974, Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter
"Plaintiff") sued the Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter
"Defendants") as a partnership doing business as "The Exchange,"
for the reasonable value of materials furnished and labor
performed upon real property leased by The Exchange.

The

Complaint stated two claims for relief, one pursuant to
Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and the other in
quantum meruit.
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Defendants moved for dismissal of the action on the
grounds that Plaintiff had sued the wrong parties, said
motion being verified (R. 4) and based, in substance, upon
the following grounds:
1.

That the three individuals named as defendants were

not, nor had they ever been a partnership, a joint venture
or a dba;
2.

That they had never done business as The Exchange;

3.

That The Exchange was the dba of The Exchange Place

Social Association, a Utah non-profit corporation; and
4.

That the Defendants individually had never con-

tracted with plaintiff or with anyone.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Stewart M.
Hanson, Jr., presiding, heard Defendants' motion to dismiss
on January 21, 1975, and, after receiving additional exhibits,
evidence and argument, determined that the three individual
defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint were not in fact a
partnership or joint venture nor were they nor had they ever
been doing business as "The Exchange11 and therefore, dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint as to those defendants.

In

dismissing said Complaint, Judge Hanson granted Plaintiff
ten days in which to refile its action against the proper
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party, The Exchange Place Social Association, a Utah nonprofit corporation.
On or about the 29th day of January, 1975, Plaintiff
made a Motion to Reconsider.

The motion was heard by Judge

Hanson on February 11, 1975, and additional argument and
evidence were presented after which Plaintiff's Motion to
Reconsider was denied.
From that order of dismissal in favor of Defendants,
Plaintiff has appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the lower court's ruling
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and for their costs of this
appeal.

In the alternative, should the Court decide in

favor of Plaintiff upon this appeal, Defendants seek an
order staying any award of costs in this matter, costs of
appeal to be awarded to that party ultimately prevailing
upon final disposition of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendants basically agree with the "Statement of the
Facts" as set out by Plaintiff in its brief with the few
exceptions and additions as set out hereinbelow.

In stating

this agreement, Defendants do wish to draw the Court's
attention to the fact that, in presenting the facts in its
brief, Plaintiff has for the most part (as Plaintiff itself
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indicates throughout its Statement of Facts) set out only
what was alleged in the Complaint and various other documents
on their face and not what the facts actually are or what
the facts have been determined to be.
Defendants1 sole exception to Plaintiff's Statement of
the Facts as set out in Plaintiff's brief is the language
referring to two architects (Dan Losee and Raymond Jones)
alleged by Plaintiff to have been "employed by Stanley
Adams."

Defendants take exception to this language only

insofar as it may indicate or infer some employment of said
architects by Mr. Adams in his individual capacity.

At no

time relevant to this case was Mr. Adams or any of the other
defendants named herein acting in their individual capacities.
Defendants wish also to add the following clarifications with respect to the Certificates of Doing Business
Under an Assumed Name (hereinafter "dba") filed May 9,
1973, (R. 36-37) and December 7, 1974, (R. 34-35) as referred to in Plaintiff's brief, which facts were also presented to the court below:
1.

The Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange Place

Social Association, a non-profit Utah corporation, were
filed May 4, 1973, (R.29) and contained the following provision as Article I thereof:
The name of this corporation is
The Exchange Place Social Association.
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(This corporation will also be known
as (aka) and do business as (dba) The
Exchange.)
2.

The Secretary of State's office, upon approving

said articles, telephoned the corporation's agent and trustee,
Stanley S. Adams, and informed him that a formal Certificate
of Doing Business Under an Assumed Name ("dba") form needed
to be filed pursuant to the terms of Article I of the Articles
of Incorporation (as set out fully above).
3.

Pursuant to said request, and approximately five

days after filing the said Articles of Incorporation, Mr.
Adams filed said "dba" under the mistaken impression that
the Secretary of State instructed that he list the actual
names of the trustees of the corporation rather than simply
the corporate name itself, which corporation was in fact
doing business as The Exchange.

Mr. Adams filed and signed

this "dba" as trustee for the corporation.
4.

(See R. 36-37)

At no time were Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby or

Tony M. Wand doing business as The Exchange nor did they at
any time hold themselves out to be doing so.
5.

On or about December 7, 1974, after discovery of

the mistaken and improper listing of the trustees' names
upon the "dba" form, a corrected "dba" form, properly listing The Exchange Place Social Association as the principal
doing business as The Exchange, was filed (R. 34-35) and the
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mistaken "dba" was withdrawn.
Further, Plaintiff and its President, Ben Holbrook, had
for several years done business with Defendant Stanley S.
Adams and had done substantial work on another private club,
The Winery, in connection with which Mr. Adams had (and
still does) serve as trustee.

Mr. Holbrook knew, at all

times relevant herein and before, the corporate form and
existence of said club and that the same was required by
law.

This fact was also brought to the attention of the

trial court.
ARGUMENT
1

*

POINT I

THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN MAKING ITS
RULING THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED AS DEFENDANTS
WERE NOT PROPER PARTIES AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY.

:

At the outset Defendants wish to bring the Court's
attention to the fact that Plaintiff has, with the sole
exception of parts of Point III in its brief, not addressed
itself to the sole issue of its own appeal. That sole issue
is whether or not the Defendants "Stanley S. Adams, Von H.
Whitby and Tony M. Wand" are proper defendants as named by
Plaintiff in its Complaint.

It is solely upon this issue

which the lower court ruled and not as to the sufficiency of
the allegations upon the two causes of action of the Complaint as is addressed by Plaintiff in its brief.
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For this

reason, and for purposes of organization in stating their
position and replying to Plaintiff's brief, Defendants will
address each formal "Point" as contained in Plaintiff's
brief.
(A) REPLY TO POINT I:
Plaintiff spends its entire time and argument in Point
I attempting to pursuade the court that Plaintiff has on its
face set out a short and plain statement of the elements of
two separate causes of action ("a claim either under Section
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, [sic] or in quantum
meruit."

See Plaintiff's brief, Page 5).

While Defendants may agree that these allegations on
their face allege causes of action in general (that is,
that these allegations allege the prima facie elements of
quantum meruit or Section 14-2-1 liability), the sufficiency
of those allegations is not at issue on this appeal.

It is

whether those causes of action are properly claimed against
the named Defendants which is at issue.
The trial court determined, upon the pleadings, evidence,
exhibits and arguments that there was no question that the
Complaint failed to show any claim against the named Defendants, Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby and Tony M. Wand,
regardless of the sufficiency of the claims themselves in
general.

Plaintiff does not even address itself to this

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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issue in Point I of its brief.

Point I therefore need not

and should not be considered by the court in its ruling.
(B) REPLY TO POINT II:
Most of Plaintiff's argument in Point II consists of
distinguishing between dismissing "for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6)" and "for summary judgment under
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56." Presumably this is done in
order that Plaintiff may "set up strawmen" to be knocked
down later in Plaintiff's Point III. The fact is that in
neither case is Plaintiff entitled to any relief upon this
appeal.
While the District Court, upon all the evidence, could
have properly found under Rule 12(b)(6) that Plaintiff's
Complaint failed to state a claim against these defendants,
nevertheless Defendants would agree with Plaintiff's allegation that, due to the acceptance of evidence and exhibits
outside of the pleadings themselves, the lower court's
ruling was technically one treating and granting Defendants'
motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In light of this agreement by both parties that the
motion was treated as one for summary judgment, Defendants
will next respond to Point III of Plaintiff's brief which is
the sole attempt by Plaintiff to address itself to the
actual issue of parties, which issue is the sole question
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and reason for this appeal,
(C) REPLY TO POINT III:
The thrust of Plaintiff's argument in Point III of its
brief is that the court could not have granted summary judgment in favor of these defendants in this case because there
existed genuine issues of material facts. With this contention Defendants (and the court below) disagree.
Plaintiff sets out in Point III four issues which it
believes show the existence of material facts sufficient to
prevent, as a matter of law, the lower court from having
granted a summary judgment.

In fact these "issues" do not

exist as determined by the lower court on all of the evidence submitted.

Separate treatment of each issue here does

indicate a basis upon which Judge Hanson could have ruled
(and presumably did rule), determining upon the evidence
before him that these Defendants did not act in an individual capacity and that, upon this sole question, no material
issue genuinely existed.

This fact in and of itself is

sufficient to find in Defendants' favor upon this appeal
under the well recognized and very basic legal principle
long accepted and followed by the Utah Supreme Court that
where orders appealed from are within the trial court's
jurisdiction and discretion, they can be attacked only upon
a showing that they were not supported by any proof or any

-9-
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construction of the evidence below.

(See: Culver v. Culver,

150 P.2d 292, 65 CA.2d 145, and Botkin v. Silveria, 49
Cal.2d 1, 120 P.2d 910, 1916-1917 (1942), specifically
approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Papanikolas Bros, v.
Surgar House Shopping Center, Utah Case No. 13821, May 27,
1975.)
The four purported "issues" raised by Plaintiff, together with a discussion of each one, follow:
1. Whether Plaintiff contracted with Defendants, or any of them, or the agent of any
of them, prior to incorporation by the Defendants
of The Exchange Place Social Association.
[Plaintiff's brief, page 12]
This first issue as stated by Plaintiff has no relevance
to the question of parties insofar as whether or not any
contract was made.

Rather, the only basis upon which this

issue effects the Court's judgment is as to the capacity of
these Defendants in making any alleged contract. More
specifically and importantly, the capacity of Defendant
Stanley S. Adams is the only capacity pled or at issue here.
If the lower court determined that Defendant Stanley S.
Adams was acting in other than an individual capacity and
that, upon the evidence there existed no material question
as to this fact, then Plaintiff is not entitled to any
relief from the lower court's ruling on the basis of this
purported issue.
The court in fact had more than ample evidence before
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it upon which to rule that Defendant Adams was not acting in
an individual capacity in any alleged contracts with Plaintiffs.

Among other evidence, the lower court had the fol-

lowing before it:
1.

The affidavit of Defendants (R. 4-6) which clearly

showed no partnership, joint venture or other operation by
these defendants as The Exchange.
2.

The affidavit of Plaintiff's President, Ben Holbrook,

(R. 12-13) which in fact no way contradicted the allegations
of Defendants1 affidavit showing no individual capacity.
3.

The lower court was further apprised of the fact,

in argument by counsel, that Defendant Stanley S. Adams was
at all times relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint, President of
Investestate, a Utah corporation, from which the premises in
question were leased by The Exchange.
4.

While Plaintiff's counsel attempted to use the

"dba" filed upon May 9, 1973, as "proof" that the three
Defendants were operating in an individual capacity, the
court correctly observed that said dba was not even in
existence for over two months after the alleged contracts
were made and that, therefore, it was of no relevance nor
could Plaintiff have relied thereon.

Further, the court

also correctly noted that this dba dated May 9 was filed
five days after the Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange
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Place Social Association which clearly set out the fact that
The Exchange was a dba of this corporation.
5.

An additional point was argued to and accepted by

the lower court with respect to the dba form dated May 9
which mistakenly named the three individual trustees. Not
only was evidence submitted to the court indicating that the
three trustees named were mistakenly listed in place of the
corporation, but the Plaintiff itself recognized that the
dba was signed by Mr. Adams "as trustee" and not as an
individual, thereby adding further support to the fact that
the individual names of the trustees were listed simply by
mistake as a result of a misunderstood communication and
directive from the Secretary of State.

(See R. 37 and

Plaintiff's brief, bottom of page 3)
6.

Additional evidence was presented at the hearing to

show that Plaintiff and its president had worked on another
private club owned and operated in exactly the same fashion
and by the same parties and that Plaintiff knew of the
corporate existence of this club and that the law required
such private clubs to be corporations.
Upon the above evidence alone the lower court could
clearly have found that no material issue existed upon this
purported issue and the court in fact so ruled.
2. Whether the Defendants, or any of them,
did business as The Exchange prior to the aforesaid

-12-
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date of incorporation, and at the time the
contract was entered into. [Plaintiff's
brief, page 13]
Plaintiff's brief bases its argument here entirely upon
the fact that there was a dba on file on May 9, 1913,

stating

that the three individuals were doing business as The Exchange.
Plaintiff does not, however, apprise the court of the other
evidence presented at the hearing which caused the lower
court to clearly rule in favor of Defendants upon this issue
and to find that there in fact existed no material issue as
to this question.
This evidence was discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6 under
issue No. 1 above and, in order to avoid repetition, Defendants will not reprint that evidence here except by way of
summary.
The lower court found that said dba dated May 9 was
filed pursuant to a directive by the Secretary of State and
that the names of the individual trustees were placed upon
said form by mistake in place of the name of The Exchange
Place Social Association.

The Court found that the Articles

of Incorporation, filed five days earlier, clearly set out
the corporate existence and operation of The Exchange. The
Court further found no reliance upon this dba in any event
due to the fact that Plaintiff's contracts were made and
performed in January and February of 1973 —

over three

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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months earlier.

In addition, the incorrect dba filed was

signed by Mr. Adams in his capacity as "trustee."

This,

when added together with all of the other evidence submitted
at the hearing, would clearly have allowed the lower court
to decide no genuine issue of material fact existed upon
this purported issue.
3. Whether prior to the aforesaid date the
Defendants, or any of them, were associated together as a joint venture or partnership. [Plaintiff's brief, page 14]
This issue is simply a restatement of "issue" No. 2.
Plaintiff's entire argument and attempt to make a material
issue appear here is again based in its entirety upon a dba
which was mistakenly filed by one of the corporate trustees
in the capacity of trustee after the Articles of Incorporati
of The Exchange Place Social Association stating clearly The
Exchange was a dba of that corporation.

The same argument

and facts as have been presented above (including the impossibility of reliance upon the same by Plaintiff in any
way, shape or form) apply here to clearly show no material
fact or issue exists on this point.

The lower court so

found and correctly ruled accordingly.
4. Also at issue is the question of the
relationship between the Defendants prior to
The Exchange Place Social Association, at which
time Plaintiff had already commenced work to
improve the leasehold. [Plaintiff's brief,
page 14]

-14-
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Plaintiff states in its brief, to support its contention that some issue exists here, that:
Nowhere in the record is it denied that
the Defendants, nor any of them, had a
leasehold interest in the real property
commonly known as 39 Exchange Place.
[Plaintiff's brief, page 14]
This is simply not true. Not only does the affidavit of
Defendants (R. 4-6) clearly by implication do so, but this
fact was specifically and directly denied at the hearing,
including the exhibition of certain leases and subleases
showing the premises and all interests therein to be at all
times relevant herein exclusively in the Salt Lake Stock
Exchange, Investestate, or The Exchange.

These leases

together with argument made at the hearing showed that there
was never any interest held by the individual defendants in
the said premises at anytime.

This was in fact the entire

reason for the Stipulation allowing Plaintiff to refile
within ten days against the proper defendant, The Exchange
Place Social Association, and the sole reason for the waiver
by said corporation of the statute of limitations provided
by Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
After setting out the above four purported issues
(which are in fact not issues at all) Plaintiff next in its
brief states:
In light of these numerous material facts
that are genuinely at issue, in order for

-15-
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the trial court to have granted summary
judgment, it must have determined these
facts in Defendants1 favor. This it cannot do! [Plaintiff's brief, page 15]
This is again another "bootstrap" operation designed by
Plaintiff to lead the Court down the garden path to Plaintiff's next statement (a quote from Hill v. Grand Central Inc.,
25 U.2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970)), that:
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to
ascertain whether there are any material
issues in dispute. If there be any such
disputed issues of fact, they cannot be
resolved by summary judgment. . . [Plaintiff 's brief, page 15]
This is referred to as a "bootstrap" operation because
Plaintiff has assumed the very question at issue, i.e.,
whether there are in fact any material facts generally at
issue.

Defendants assert that the pleadings, evidence and

argument below, all clearly admissible and properly considered by Judge Hanson (as correctly pointed out by Plaintiff in its brief and by Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 cited
therein) were, when viewed together, so clear as to compel
the lower court to find that no material question genuinely
existed as to whether these Defendants were doing business
in their individual capacity.

That is, the evidence was so

clear that the Court, being fully advised and upon the
entire record, argument and evidence before it, ascertained
that there were no material issues of fact at dispute.
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Plaintiff's position in its brief appears to be simply
that in order for there to exist "a material fact" which is
"genuinely at issue" counsel need only submit one affidavit
or stand up at a hearing and make one statement which disagrees with another affidavit or statement of the opposing
party.

This is simply not the case even as is made clear by

all of the authorities cited by Plaintiff itself in its
brief.
Rule 12(b) states in part (cited at Page 11 of Plaintiff's brief):
. . . The motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.
[Emphasis added]
It is clear under the rule that the lower court properly
admitted and considered all evidence in its determination.
Rule 56 then (again as stated by Plaintiff in its brief at
page 12) provides that:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if [all of the evidence presented to the court] show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
The lower court did have a duty to examine the entire
evidence and, upon that evidence, to "ascertain whether
there are any material issues of fact in dispute."

-17-
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(Hill v. Grand

Central Inc., supra.)

This is exactly what the lower court

did and it determined that no such material facts genuinely
existed.

•

;;

. -v.-;

The lower court and only the lower court had the
opportunity to examine and be fully advised upon the entire
evidence, exhibits and argument of counsel for both sides.
It is for this reason that the Utah Supreme Court has unceasingly been committed to the basic principle that,
. . . reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's
discretion in the matter, unless it appears
that a manifest injustice has been done,
or the decision cannot reasonably be
found to be supported by the evidence.
[Emphasis added] Papanikolas Bros.
Enterprises v. Sugar House Shopping
Center Associates, et al., supra.
Our case goes even further.

Plaintiff, pursuant to its

request, was given a rehearing on this question by the lower
court.

At the second hearing, held on this issue on February

11, Judge Hanson again gave both sides another opportunity
to fully argue the question and to present any additional
evidence or exhibits.

In their motion and at that hearing,

Plaintiff's counsel in fact specifically argued to the court
the same arguments presented in Plaintiff'$ brief that there
existed material facts.

(R. 16-15)

At the conclusion of

that hearing, Judge Hanson disagreed and he again reaffirmed
his ruling that the evidence was clear and that no material

-18-
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facts genuinely existed and that the three Defendants named
were not acting as individuals and were clearly not proper
defendants.
Defendants respectfully request this court to affirm
the lower court's well informed and proper decision upon
this matter.
POINT II
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF, ANY AWARD OF COSTS SHOULD BE STAYED,
THE SAME BEING AWARDED TO THAT PARTY WHICH ULTIMATELY PREVAILS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS
MATTER.
This court clearly has equitable powers in deciding
upon the most proper and equitable method for the awarding
of costs upon an appeal such as this.

Should Defendants

prevail, as we believe to be the proper result, these Defendants will be dismissed from the lawsuit entirely and
should, therefore, receive their costs.
In the alternative, however, should Plaintiff prevail
upon this appeal the effect will be to continue the lawsuit
in the lower court against these Defendants toward a determination upon the merits.

In such a case, it is certainly

foreseeable that these Defendants may win on the merits
after a trial indicating that Plaintiff never in fact had
any cause of action whatsoever.

Indeed, Defendants submit

that, should Plaintiff win here, it will nevertheless lose
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in the resulting trial below.
Should Defendants lose on this appeal but be ultimately
successful below, it would clearly be inequitable to order
that they pay Plaintiff's costs in appealing a single issue
in a lawsuit where it is ultimately determined Plaintiff has
no cause of action.
For these reasons, Defendants request the Court to
award them costs in affirming the lower court's decision.
In the alternative, should this court find in favor of
Plaintiff on this issue, Defendants request that any award
of costs be stayed, the same to be awarded to whichever
party prevails on the merits below.
CONCLUSION
The lower court twice had the opportunity for a full
and complete hearing upon the single question at issue in
this appeal. After being fully advised upon the pleadings,
evidence, exhibits and argument by counsel for both sides,
the lower court determined that the three named Defendants
were not doing business as The Exchange nor were they acting
in any individual capacity at any time or for any purposes
relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint.

The lower court found

the evidence to be so clear as to indicate that no material
facts were genuinely at issue on this question and the court
properly dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint accordingly with
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leave to refile against the proper Defendants.
This court has long subscribed to the position that it
will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court in
making such a ruling unless the decision cannot reasonably
be found to be supported by the evidence.

The lower court's

decision in this case was amply if not overwhelmingly supported by the admissible evidence before the court and, as
such, may not properly be overturned on appeal.
Defendants respectfully request this court to affirm
the lower court's ruling dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint
and to award Defendants their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON

*rneys for Defendantsspondents
200, The Glass Factory
Arrow Press Square
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that three true and correct copies
of the foregoing Respondents1 Brief were mailed to F. Burton
Howard and Charles C. Brown, Boyden & Kennedy, attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1000 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84133, this } ^

day of July, 1975, postage prepaid.
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